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United States v. School District
Of Omaha, 521 F.2d 530 (1975).
We conclude that in the field of public education the doctrine
of "separate but equal" has no place. Separate educational facil-
ities are inherently unequal. Therefore, we hold that the plaintiffs
and others similarly situated. .. are, by reason of the segregation
complained of, deprived of the equal protection of the laws guaran-
teed by the Fourteenth Amendment.1
I. INTRODUCTION
With this historic language the Supreme Court in Brown v.
Board of Education2 held that state-imposed public school segrega-
tion was unconstitutional since it violated the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment.8 Remedial requirements were
later promulgated in Brown II.4 There the Court held that "[a] 11
provisions of federal, state, or local law requiring or permitting
such discrimination must yield" to that principle stated in Brown
I,5 and that such action must be taken "with all deliberate speed." 6
A great deal of litigation involving alleged state-imposed ra-
cial segregation in the public schools has been inspired by the
Brown mandate. One of the most recent cases was United States
v. School District of Omaha.7 The Department of Justice initiated
that action,8 alleging that unconstitutional racial segregation existed
1. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954).
2. Id.
3. "[N]or shall any State . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV.
4. Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
5. Id. at 298.
6. Id. at 301.
7. 389 F. Supp. 293 (D. Neb. 1974), rev'd 521 F.2d 530 (8th Cir. 1975).
8. Certain black students in the Omaha public schools and their parents
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within the Omaha public schools and seeking remedial relief. The
School District of Omaha, State of Nebraska, the Superintendent
of Schools for the School District, and the twelve members of the
Board of Education for the School District were named as defend-
ants. Previously, a motion for preliminary injunction, after a full
evidentiary hearing, had been denied by the same courtY
It was alleged that the defendants had engaged in a policy of
intentional school segregation within the Omaha School District in
violation of Title IV of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the four-
teenth amendment of the United States Constitution. The plain-
tiffs sought affirmative relief through a mandatory court-imposed
school desegregation order. After an extensive factual analysis, the
district court concluded that there was insufficient evidence of in-
tentional racial discrimination to justify judicial intervention, de-
nied plaintiffs the relief sought, and dismissed their suit.10
This decision was appealed to the Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit,1 where it was heard before a special three judge
panel.'12  The appellate court reversed and remanded the decision
of the district court, concluding that the lower court had applied
an incorrect legal standard for determining segregative intent,1
3
and that there was sufficient evidence of intentional segregation
within the Omaha School District to necessitate a judicial remedy.
The court directed the Omaha School Board to promulgate and im-
plement a complete desegregation program for the entire school dis-
trict before the 1976-77 school year.' 4
as representatives of the aggrieved class were allowed to intervene as
plaintiffs by court order pursuant to FED. R. Civ. P. 24(b). United
States v. School Dist. of Omaha, 367 F. Supp. 198 (D. Neb. 1973).
9. United States v. School Dist. of Omaha, 367 F. Supp. 179 (D. Neb.
1973).
10. [T]his Court is convinced that this record simply does not jus-
tify the finding and determination that the school authorities
in question intentionally discriminated against minority stu-
dents by practicing a deliberate policy of racial segregation.
Without such a finding, the law does not require that a school
system developed on the neighborhood plan, honestly and
conscientiously framed and administered, without intention or
purpose to discriminate racially, must be set aside or aban-
doned because a racial imbalance in certain schools sometimes
is the result.
389 F. Supp. at 322.
11. 521 F.2d 530 (8th Cir. 1975).
12. The members of the special three judge panel were Warren L. Jones,
Senior Circuit Judge, Fifth Circuit, Jacksonville, Florida; Myron H.
Bright, Circuit Judge, Eighth Circuit, Fargo, North Dakota; and Gerald
W. Heaney, Circuit Judge, Eighth Circuit, Duluth, Minnesota.
13. See notes 34-36 and accompanying text infra.
14. The court promulgated several guidelines to aid in implementing the
integration remedy. They include these recommendations: (1) reas-
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This Note will examine the opinions of the district court and
court of appeals discussing each on its own merits, and then in rela-
tion to the other. An historical perspective will be developed to
provide a basis for more complete understanding of the constitu-
tional principles and issues surrounding desegregation litigation.
H. THE DECISION
The Omaha School District encompasses the majority of the City
of Omaha, as well as parts of Sarpy County. Census figures indi-
cate that in 1970 there were 34,431 blacks residing in Omaha, 9.9 per-
cent of the total population.15 School board figures reveal that for
the 1973-74 school year, black students comprised 19.8 percent of
the total student enrollment.1 6 Blacks in Omaha generally reside
in a racially identifiable neighborhood commonly referred to as the
Near North Side, although currently there is evidence of a modest
neighborhood expansion.17 Racial segregation in Omaha schools
had never been statutorily or constitutionally maintained,'8 but
it had arisen subsequent to the Brown I mandate.19
In alleging that racial segregation in the Omaha Public Schools
had been maintained by intentional state action, the plaintiffs relied
on seven main factual categories: (1) segregation in the elementary
schools as a product of the use of temporary classrooms, and de-
signment of students should be avoided wherever possible; (2) in
schools with black enrollment below 25%, such enrollment shall not
be increased above 25%; (3) in schools where black enrollment is
between 25% and 35%, it should not be made to significantly increase;
and (4) in those schools where black enrollment exceeds 35%, attend-
ance policies should be altered so such attendance level does not ex-
ceed 35%. 521 F.2d at 546-47.
In a ruling, on July 7, 1975, denying a rehearing of the case by
the full Eighth Circuit court, the three judge panel amended paragraph
four to allow the district court in its discretion to deviate from these
recommendations in the following respects: (1) those black schools
with a current black enrollment exceeding 50% may be allowed to
lower that enrollment level to 50% rather than 35%; and (2) those
schools with a black enrollment between 35% and 50% may be allowed
to maintain that level.
15. 389 F. Supp. at 297.
16. Id.
17. The district court indicated that there had been evidence of a gradual
increase in black residential concentration in zones to the west and
north of the Near North Side, as well as a small concentration of
blacks residing in the southeastern portion of the school district. Id.
at 298.
18. Id. at 296.
19. This fact is apparent from the district court's brief discussion of his-
torical background information. Id. at 297-98.
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layed conversion from a K-8 to K-6 system in certain racially iden-
tifiable schools;20 (2) segregation in the junior high schools as a
product of initial new school placement, delayed conversion to a
K-6 system in specific elementary schools, and use of optional atten-
dance zones; (3) segregation in the high schools pursuant to racially
inspired student assignments; (4) segregation resulting from a spe-
cial student transfer policy; 21 (5) discrimination in hiring and as-
signment of black faculty and staff; (6) segregation pursuant to
policies involving new school construction and additions to existing
buildings; and (7) segregation resulting from general housing con-
ditions and school board cooperation with real estate developers.
The plaintiffs contended that these facts indicated a prima facie
case of de jure segregation which resulted from a policy of inten-
tional racial segregation initiated by the Omaha School Board. The
defendant school board, in response, maintained that any segrega-
tion in the district was de facto in nature, and was the by-product
of the strict implementation of a neutral neighborhood school
policy.
22
The district court predicated its legal analysis on the constitu-
tional principles enumerated by the Supreme Court in Keyes v.
20. A K-8 school is a primary or elementary school housing grades one
through eight. Conversely, a K-6 school houses only grades one
through six, necessitating an intermediary junior high school The
plaintiffs alleged that the school board maintained certain predom-
inantly white elementary schools as K-8 schools long after a system-
wide conversion to a K-6 system was mandated, thereby preventing
the white children that attended those schools from being assigned to
a predominantly black junior high school. Id. at 298-300.
21. In this respect, the plaintiffs alleged that the special student transfer
policy increased segregation by allowing white students assigned to
predominantly black schools to transfer to predominantly white
schools. The plaintiffs also alleged that the transfer policy inherently
discriminated against blacks by allowing a student to transfer only
when his personal achievement level equalled or was superior to the
average achievement level of the school to which he intended to trans-
fer, and by requiring the student to furnish his own transportation.
Id. at 311-17.
22. "De jure segregation" has traditionally been defined as "segregation
specifically mandated by law or by public policy pursued under color
of law." Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401, 492 (D.D.C. 1967). "De
facto segregation", on the other hand, is defined as racial imbalance
resulting merely "from the action of pupil assignment policies not
based on race but upon social or other conditions for which govern-
ment cannot be held responsible." Id. at 493. Goodman, De Facto
School Segregation: A Constitutional and Empirical Analysis, 60
CAL. L. REv. 275 (1972); Smedley, Developments in the Law of School
Desegregation, 26 VAxrm. L. REv. 405, 422 (1973). See generally Com-
ment, Keyes v. School District No. 1: Unlocking the Northern School-
house Doors, 9 HARv. Civ. RiGHTs-Civ. Li. L. REv. 124 (1974).
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School District No. 123 and promulgated a two-tiered test for un-
constitutional de jure segregation.24 "[A] constitutional violation
is found where: (1) There is a current condition of racial segrega-
tion; and (2) This condition has been caused or maintained by in-
tentional state action. ' 25  The court conceded that a substantial
degree of racial imbalance existed within the Omaha Public Schools
and that the actions of the defendant school board constituted state
action.
26
The primary issue then became "whether the racial imbalance
[within the school district] has been intentionally caused or main-
tained by the defendants. " 27  Since intent is a subjective concept
provable only by objective criteria, to demonstrate it is a difficult
task.28 The district court recognized this burden 29 and set forth
23. 413 U.S. 189 (1973). Keyes was the first Supreme Court case to deal
with segregation in a northern school district where a dual system of
education had not previously been maintained. See notes 38-47 and
accompanying text infra.
24. "[T]he legal principles upon which claims with respect to this school
system must be resolved are those set forth by the Supreme Court
in Keyes.. . ." 389 F. Supp. at 296.
25. Id. This interpretation of the Keyes doctrine is substantially, although
not precisely, correct. Actually, the district court in Keyes outlined
a four-pronged test to determine whether there was unconstitutional
racial segregation in the Denver school district:
(1) The State, or more specifically, the school administration,
must have taken some action with a purpose to segregate;
(2) this action must have in fact created or aggravated segre-
gation at the school or schools in question;
(3) a current condition of segregation must exist; and
(4) there must be a causal connection between the acts of the
school administration complained of and the current condition
of segregation.
Keyes v. School Dist. Number One, 313 F. Supp. 61, 73 (D. Colo. 1970).
The Supreme Court did not have the opportunity to examine specifi-
cally the correctness of this test except in dicta, since the only issues
presented to the Court for review dealt with the presumption of segre-
gative intent once there had been an initial finding of de jure segrega-
tion in one portion of the school district. See note 46 infra.
26. 389 F. Supp. at 296. Under several authorities, most notably Cisneros
v. Corpus Christi Independent School Dist., 467 F.2d 142 (5th Cir.
1972), and United States v. Texas Educ. Agency, 467 F.2d 848 (5th
Cir. 1972), such legal admissions would in themselves appear sufficient
for a finding of intentionally maintained de jure segregation. See note
50 infra.
27. 389 F. Supp. at 296.
28. Many authorities have recognized the difficulty of objectively deter-
mining intent. Chief Justice Warren once noted that where a statute
is constitutional on its face, examining legislative history in search for
unconstitutional intent approximates "guesswork." United States v.
O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 384 (1968). This problem in determining segre-
gative intent is further magnified by "the extremely equivocal charac-
ter of many school board decisions, the lack of extensive records, and
SCHOOL SEGREGATION
three principles to "keep in mind" when looking for segregative in-
tent. First, the plaintiffs had the burden of proving intent by
showing that a segregative policy was practiced over a meaningful
or significant portion of the school district. Once this was done,
the burden shifted to the defendants to show that their actions
were not motivated by segregative intent.80 Second, since intent
was not readily admitted, it had to be inferred from the objective
actions of the defendants.31 Finally, in interpreting Keyes' empha-
sis on intent,32 the court stated that "the natural and foreseeable
consequences of the defendants' actions are neither determinative
nor immaterial, but rather constitute one additional factor to be
weighed in evaluating the defendants' overall intent.133 This third
principle was significant, since the court primarily relied upon it
in concluding that the school board did not act with specific segre-
gative intent.
The appellate court agreed with the district court that intent
must be inferentially deduced,34 but found reversible error in that
the standard of proof promulgated by the district court for a showing
of segregative intent did not adequately reflect current constitu-
tional principles. According to the appellate court the proper
the ability of a truly segregative board to produce a 'clear' history
of its policy formulation." Comment, supra note 22, at 142.
29. "A determination of the intent of a person or a public body with re-
spect to action or inaction on any question is necessarily difficult."
389 F. Supp. at 296.
30. This principle is derived from the Keyes case, 413 U.S. at 208-09.
31. Citing to United States v. Board of School Comm'rs of Indianapolis,
474 F.2d 81 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 413 U.S. 920 (1973).
32. See note 44 and accompanying text infra.
33. 389 F. Supp. at 297. As authority for this principle the district court
cited to Oliver v. Kalamazoo Bd. of Educ., 368 F. Supp. 143 (W.D.
Mich. 1973). As shall be discussed later, reliance on this opinion for
this particular principle of law may be misplaced. See notes 51-62
infra. The court also cited to the cases of Johnson v. San Francisco
Unified School Dist., 339 F. Supp. 1315 (ND. Cal. 1971), rev'd, 500 F.2d
349 (9th Cir. 1974) and Soria v. Oxnard School Dist. Bd. of Trustees,
328 F. Supp. 155 (C.D. Cal. 1971), rev'd, 488 F.2d 579 (9th Cir. 1973)
as examples of district court opinions which inferred segregative intent
from natural and foreseeable consequences and which were reversed
on appeal for lack of emphasis on intent. The Johnson and Soria dis-
trict court opinions, however, went much further than implying segre-
gative intent from natural and foreseeable consequences but implied
a total rejection of the de jure-de facto distinction. It was primarily
for this reason, in the wake of the Keyes decision, that the decisions
were reversed.
34. "The District Court properly recognized that segregative intent usually
must be inferred." 521 F.2d at 535. This conclusion was reached after
the plaintiffs conceded that segregative intent was a prerequisite to
a finding of unconstitutionality and an uncontested recognition that
the Omaha Public Schools were in fact segregated. Id. at 533.
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standard was "that a presumption of segregative intent arises once
it is established that school authorities have engaged in acts or
omissions, the natural, probable and foreseeable consequence of
which is to bring about or maintain segregation."3 5 This presump-
tion was rebuttable, shifting the burden of proof to the defendant
school board to negate the inference.36
The district court erred in failing to recognize that this presump-
tion of segregative intent was implicit when acts or omissions which
resulted in natural and foreseeable segregative consequences were
proven. This error resulted in an improper analysis of the facts
of the case. The appellate court concluded that under the "natural
and foreseeable consequence test" there had been ample evidence
to raise a presumption of segregative intent in five school board
decision-making areas: faculty assignments, student transfers, op-
tional attendance zones, school construction, and the deterioration
of Technical High School.37 The court determined that the defend-
ants had failed to sustain their burden of negating the segregative
inference, and, therefore, held that the Omaha School District was
unconstitutionally segregated. An order was rendered requiring
the school board to promulgate and implement a complete desegre-
gation program under the supervision of the district court.
III. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
The principal case upon which any analysis of alleged unconsti-
tutional racial segregation in a northern school district must be
founded is Keyes v. School District No. 1.38 In that opinion the
Supreme Court, for the first time, applied the mandates of Brown
to northern school segregation.39
35. Id. at 535-36.
36. Id. at 536. The court here is citing to 413 U.S. at 210.
37. The court of appeals held that school board action in creating an open
attendance policy between Technical High School and Central High
School, in deleting certain attractive vocational courses from the cur-
riculum at Tech, in permitting Tech's enrollment to drop far below
capacity, and in assigning most black high school teachers to Tech,
combined to result in foreseeable and inevitable racial segregation at
Technical High School. 521 F.2d at 544-46.
38. 413 U.S. 189 (1973). The prior opinions can be found at 445 F.2d 990
(10th Cir. 1971), aff'g in part 313 F. Supp. 90 (D. Colo. 1971) and 313
F. Supp. 61 (D. Colo. 1971), preliminary injunction granted, 303 F.
Supp. 289 (D. Colo. 1969), modifying 303 F. Supp. 279 (D. Colo. 1969).
Subsequent opinions are at 380 F. Supp. 673 (D. Colo. 1974) and 368
F. Supp. 207 (D. Colo. 1973).
39. Prior to Keyes the Supreme Court had dealt only with school segre-
gation in southern school districts where racial segregation had pre-
viously been statutorily maintained. This history of statutorily reg-
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Keyes dealt with alleged state-imposed racial segregation in the
school district of Denver, Colorado. The Supreme Court, pursuant
to an initial district court finding of de jure segregative practices
within one segment of the school district,40 held that sufficient
de jure segregation existed within that portion of the district to
give rise to a presumption of segregative intent over the entire dis-
trict and thereby shift the burden of proof to the defendant school
board.41 Upon remand, the district court held that the school
board had not sufficiently sustained its burden of proof42 and im-
posed a court ordered system-wide desegregation remedy.43
The significance of Keyes goes beyond the fact that it was
the first Supreme Court decision to impose a court-ordered remedy
for racial segregation in a northern school district. It reaffirmed
the traditional de jure-de facto approach to school segregation,44
with the additional requirement that before judicial remedial action
could be taken, it must be shown that there was a dual school sys-
tem maintained by intentional state action. Keyes was also signif-
icant in that for the first time, a showing of de jure segregation
in only a "substantial or meaningful portion" of a school district
was sufficient to raise the presumption that state-imposed segrega-
tion had been maintained over the entire district. Once this show-
ing was made, the burden of proof shifted to the defendant school
board to negate the presumption of segregative intent.45
The Keyes opinion also had its obvious limitations. It dealt ex-
clusively with the effect that a finding of de jure segregation in
one portion of a school district would have in raising a presumption
of segregative intent over the entire district.46 Therefore, there
ulated racial segregation, combined with proof that segregation
currently existed within the specific school district, was generally
sufficient to invoke a judicial remedy. See Swann v. Charlotte-
Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971). See also Comment, Pub-
lic School Segregation and the Contours of Unconstitutionality: The
Denver School Board Case, 45 U. COLO. 1. REV. 457 (1974).
40. Keyes v. School Dist. Number One, 313 F. Supp. 61 (D. Colo. 1971);
Keyes v. School Dist. Number One, 313 F. Supp. 90 (D. Colo. 1971).
41. 413 U.S. at 208.
42. 368 F. Supp. at 207.
43. 380 F. Supp. at 673.
44. "We emphasize that the differentiating factor between de jure segre-
gation [dual] and so-called de facto segregation [unitary] ... is
purpose or intent to segregate." 413 U.S. at 208. (Emphasis in orig-
inal).
45. 413 U.S. at 208.
46. "We [Supreme Court] granted petitioner's petition for certiorari to re-
view the Court of Appeal's judgment insofar as it reversed that part
of the District Court's Final Decree as pertained to the core city
schools." Id. at 195. Thus the Court limited its review to deal only
with one area of the Denver School District where segregation previ-
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was no discussion of the proper legal standard and evidentiary re-
quirements for making an initial determination of segregative in-
tent. Furthermore, since the petitioners in Keyes conceded that
proof of segregative intent was a prerequisite to a judicial rem-
edy,47 the Court did not have to consider whether de facto segre-
gation in itself was sufficient to raise a presumption of unconstitu-
tionality and invoke a judicial remedy.
Historically, northern courts have varied greatly on the burden
of proof necessary to establish segregative intent. Early courts re-
quired a heavy burden and generally were willing to accept justi-
fications for segregative policies grounded upon good faith.48
Proof of knowledge of the segregative effects of various school
board policies was usually not sufficient to establish segregative
intent. However, more recent decisions have implied segregative in-
tent where such conscious awareness was shown.49  This aware-
ness is generally inferred from the natural and foreseeable segrega-
tive consequences of such school board policies. Typical examples
of discriminatory practices resulting in foreseeable racial imbalance
ously had not been found to have been maintained intentionally. The
original finding by the district court of de jure segregation in the Park
Hill area of Denver was not reviewed. See generally Comment, supra
note 39, at 475.
47. Petitioners apparently concede for the purposes of this case
that in the case of a school system like Denver's, where no
statutory dual system has ever existed, plaintiffs must prove
not only that segregated schooling exists but also that it was
brought about or maintained by intentional state action.
413 U.S. at 198.
48. Downs v. Board of Educ., 336 F.2d 988 (10th Cir. 1964), cert. denied,
380 U.S. 914 (1965); Deal v. Cincinnati Bd. of Educ., 244 F. Supp. 572
(S.D. Ohio 1965), modified, 369 F.2d 55 (6th Cir. 1966), cert. denied,
389 U.S. 847 (1967); Barksdale v. Springfield School Comm., 237 F.
Supp. 543 (D. Mass. 1963), vacated, 348 F.2d 261 (1st Cir. 1965); Sealy
v. Department of Pub. Instruction, 159 F. Supp. 561 (E.D. Pa. 1957),
aff'd, 252 F.2d 898 (3d Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 975 (1958).
49. Hart v. Community School Bd. of Educ., N.Y. School Dist. No. 21, 512
F.2d 37 (2d Cir. 1975); Morgan v. Hennigan, 379 F. Supp. 410 (D. Mass.
1974); Oliver v. Kalamazoo Bd. of Educ., 368 F. Supp. 143 (W.D. Mich.
1973); Bradley v. Milliken, 338 F. Supp. 582 (E.D. Mich. 1971), aff'd
in part and vacated in part, 484 F.2d 215 (6th Cir. 1973), rev'd on other
grounds, 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
The district court in Keyes inferred segregative intent from the
placement of new schools with the "conscious knowledge" that segre-
gation would result. 303 F. Supp. at 285. This language was approved
in dicta by the Supreme Court. 413 U.S. at 201-02.
In Bradley, the Supreme Court gave its implied approval to the
"natural and foreseeable consequence test" by affirming that portion
of the district court's opinion in which such standard was used.
"[U] nder our decision last Term in Keyes . . . the findings [of segre-
gative intent] appear to be correct." 418 U.S. at 738 n.18.
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are: construction of new schools; gerrymandering of school boun-
daries; special school transfer policies; use of optional attendance
zones; hiring and assignment of faculty and staff; curriculum
changes; and additions to and repair of existing schools.
Other courts have gone even further and infer segregative intent
when the segregative impact of a school board policy is shown to
be "reasonably foreseeable."50  Adoption of this theory implies a
breakdown of the traditional de jure-de facto distinction.
IV. CURRENT CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES
Recent desegregation cases from northern school districts ex-
emplify current constitutional principles regarding proof of segre-
gative intent. One such case was Oliver v. Kalamazoo Board of
Education51 which dealt with alleged state-imposed racial segre-
gation in the school system of Kalamazoo, Michigan. Confronted
with a factual basis similar to that in the Omaha case, the Michigan
district court applied a test for segregative intent promulgated upon
the Keyes doctrine and specifically rejected other judicial prece-
dents because they lacked the necessary emphasis on intent.52
50. Cisneros v. Corpus Christi Indep. School Dist., 467 F.2d 142 (5th Cir.
1972) (en banc), cert. denied, 413 U.S. 922 (1973); United States v.
Texas Educ. Agency, 467 F.2d 848 (5th Cir. 1972); Hart v. Community
School Bd. of Educ., N.Y. School Dist. No. 21, 383 F. Supp. 699
(E.D.N.Y. 1974).
The Cisneros decision is particulary significant because certiorari
to the Supreme Court was denied just four days after the Keyes de-
cision. Thus the Supreme Court may have acquiesced in the Fifth Cir-
cuit's apparent abandonment of the de jure-de facto dichotomy.
Discriminatory motive and purpose, while they may reinforce
a finding of effective segregation, are not necessary ingredi-
ents of constitutional violations in the field of public educa-
tion. We therefore hold that the racial and ethnic segregation
that exists in the Corpus Christi school system is unconstitu-
tional-not de facto, not de jure, but unconstitutional. (Em-
phasis added).
467 F.2d at 149. It must be noted, however, that Justices Berger, Stew-
art, Blackmun, and Rehnquist wanted to send the case back to the dis-
trict court for further consideration in light of Keyes. See generally
Comment, supra note 22, at 149.
51. 368 F. Supp. 143 (W.D. Mich. 1973), affd sub noma. Oliver v. Michigan
State Bd. of Educ., 508 F.2d 178 (6th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421
U.S. 963 (1975).
52. As in the Omaha case, the district court in Oliver applied a two-tiered
test for segregative intent. Once there has been a showing that seg-
regation exists, the plaintiffs must then establish that (1) such segre-
gation was caused or maintained by state action and (2) the state
acted intentionally. The district court specifically rejected the less
rigid requirements promulgated in Cisneros, choosing to follow Keyes
and its renewed emphasis on intent.
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Upon finding that racial segregation in fact existed within the
school district and that school board action was properly classified
as state action, the district court found the basic issue to be one
of determining whether there was sufficient evidence to infer spe-
cific segregative intent on the part of the school authorities.
As in the Omaha case, the Michigan court recognized the diffi-
culty of objectively proving a subjective concept and couched its
analysis of intent on the tort theory that a reasonable man should
be held to intend the natural consequences of his actions.5 3 This
principle, the court reasoned, was implicit within the authority of
Bradley v. Milliken,54 which had been cited with implied approval
by the Supreme Court in Keyes.55 From this rationale, the court
concluded that a presumption of racially motivated segregative
intent would arise upon a showing of any school board act or omis-
sion whose clearly foreseeable consequences would be to cause or
maintain segregative conditions over a substantial portion of the
school district.56 The Michigan court used this analysis and found
that there was intentional segregation in a school district which was
administered under a neutral neighborhood attendance policy. The
court emphasized that a "neighborhood" is defined when the school
board draws the boundaries, 57 and that assigning a child to the
school nearest his home "serves no compelling educational objective
which supersedes constitutionally protected rights." 8
53. "In general, it is reasonable to infer that people intended the natural
and probable consequences of acts knowingly done or knowingly omit-
ted." 368 F. Supp. at 161.
54. It is established that where an appropriate factual showing
has been made, including a showing that an existing segre-
gated situation is to a significant extent the natural, probable,
and actual result of the actions and inactions of the state and
local agencies, the plaintiffs have laid an evidentiary founda-
tion for the conclusion that the results, segregated schools,
were intended to be reached by these authorities.
Id. at 162. The court here was citing to Bradley v. Milliken, 484 F.2d
215, 222, 241-42 (6th Cir. 1973) (en banc) and Davis v. School Dist.
of Pontiac, 309 F. Supp. 734, 744 (E.D. Mich. 1970), affd, 443 F.2d 573
(6th Cir. 1971). For a more complete discussion of Bradley see note
49 supra.
55. 413 U.S. at 210.
56. [W]here consequences of failure to act are clearly foresee-
able, and where those consequences are significant contribu-
tions to the creation or maintenance of segregated schools, the
failure to act is deliberate and intentional. Moreover. . . the
deliberate failure to act [to alleviate racial imbalance] by ei-
ther state or local authorities must itself be actionable in this
court.
368 F. Supp. at 178,
57. Id. at 166.
58. Id. at 164.
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This decision was affirmed on appeal to the Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit,59 which had had considerable experience
with school desegregation litigation.60 The court specifically af-
firmed the lower court's use of natural and foreseeable conse-
quences as evidence of segregative intent. It summarized its legal
conclusions in the following manner:
A finding of de jure segregation requires a showing of three
elements: (1) action or inaction by public officials, (2) with a
segregative purpose, (3) which actually results in increased or con-
tinued segregation in the public schools. A presumption of segre-
gative purpose arises when plaintiffs establish that the natural,
probable and foreseeable result of public officials' action or inac-
tion was an increase or perpetuation of public school segregation.
The presumption becomes proof unless defendants affirmatively
establish that their action or inaction was a consistent and resolute
application of racially neutral policies. 61
A petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court for review of this
decree was denied.
62
Another recent decision, Morgan v. Hennigan,63 involved al-
leged unconstitutional racial segregation in the school district of
Boston, Massachusetts.64 There the district court applied the
Keyes requirements pursuant to a showing of de jure segregation
and concluded that intent was the "paramount" issue for considera-
tion.65 In analyzing intent, the court first distinguished "motive"
from "intent", stating that "[m] otive is what prompts a person to
take some action", while intent "refers to his decision to do a partic-
ular act as a means of achieving that result."66  Since intent is
the primary element for showing de jure segregation, and because
it necessarily involves subjective conceptualizations, the court rea-
soned that "intent . . . may not be proved directly . . . but may
59. Oliver v. Michigan State Bd. of Educ., 508 F.2d 178 (6th Cir. 1974).
60. See Berry v. School Dist. of City of Benton Harbor, 505 F.2d 238 (6th
Cir. 1974); Brinkman v. Gilligan, 503 F.2d 684 (6th Cir. 1974); Brad-
ley v. Milliken, 484 F.2d 215 (6th Cir. 1973); Davis v. School Dist. of
Pontiac, 443 F.2d 573 (6th Cir. 1971).
61. 508 F.2d at 182 (emphasis added).
62. 421 U.S. 963 (1975).
63. 379 F. Supp. 410 (D. Mass. 1974), aff'd sub. nom. Morgan v. Kerrigan,
509 F.2d 580 (1st Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 963 (1975).
64. This case and the resulting desegregation order initiated the recent
racially motivated disturbances at South Boston High School.
65. The paramount issue in this case is whether the defendants
acted with a "purpose of intent to segregate" either with a
desire to bring about or continue segregation in the Boston
schools or with knowledge that such segregation was certain,
or substantially certain, to result from their actions.
379 F. Supp. at 478 (emphasis added).
66. Id.
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be inferred from the surrounding circumstances. '67 Putting this
analysis into its historical perspective, the court concluded that ra-
cial segregation, deliberately caused or maintained by overt or co-
vert means, is unconstitutional, even if discrimination is not the
sole motivation for such action.
68
By distinguishing "motive" from "intent", the district court cre-
ated a highly objective standard to use to test for the existence
of de jure segregation. Intent could be implied "from the surround-
ing circumstances." Since the set of "surrounding circumstances"
would contain the "certain, or substantially certain" consequences
of one's actions, the court impliedly affirmed the principle that
school authorities will be held responsible for segregation which
was the product of the natural and foreseeable consequences of
their actions.
In affirming the Morgan case,69 the Court of Appeals for the
First Circuit reviewed the facts of the case in conjunction with the
legal presumptions arrived at by the district court and concluded
that the lower court was correct in its finding of unconstitutional
racial segregation in the Boston public schools.7 0 As with Oliver,
an appeal for certiorari to the Supreme Court was denied.7'1
Hart v. Community School Board of Brooklyn, N.Y. School
District No. 2172 was another case that affirmed the use of natural
and foreseeable segregative consequences as a presumption of segre-
gative intent in a de jure-de facto context. It involved alleged un-
constitutional segregation in one predominantly black school in a
67. Id.
68. A long line of decisions beginning with Brown v. Board of
Education... established that a dual school system explicitly
imposed by law is unconstitutional. The Keyes case simply
makes it clear that the intentional imposition of a dual school
system by covert or subtle means is equally unconstitutional.
It should be clearly understood that racial hostility is not the
applicable standard. Segregation need not have been inspired
by any particular racial attitude to be unconstitutional ....
Also, the intent to segregate need not be the sole purpose for
the defendants' actions; it need only be one of them.
Id.
69. Morgan v. Kerrigan, 509 F.2d 580 (1st Cir. 1974).
70. We have addressed the facts found and the district court's
inferences drawn as to segregative purpose, and have found
no error. Moreover, even if the individual instances were not
by themselves capable of supporting a finding of discrimina-
tory intent-and we think those addressed were sufficient-
they clearly create a definite pattern of intentional segrega-
tory motives and practices.
Id. at 592.
71. 421 U.S. 963 (1975).
72. 383 F. Supp. 699 (E.D.N.Y. 1974), af'd, 512 F.2d 37 (2nd Cir. 1975).
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New York City school district. The district court held that a pre-
sumption of segregative intent arose pursuant to the school board's
failure to remedy foreseeable segregation caused by shifting resi-
dential patterns73 As a result of this, the New York school district
was held to be unconstitutionally segregated and implementation of
a complete desegregation remedy was ordered.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed
this decision74 and affirmed the proposition that natural and fore-
seeable segregative consequences were sufficient to give rise to a
presumption of segregative intent. The court reasoned that intent
was an inherently illusive concept especially when it dealt with
group motivation, and that to require proof of intent beyond na-
tural and foreseeable consequences was to assign an impossible task.
However, the court refused to go as far as the district court in in-
cluding avoidable consequences as additional proof of intentional
segregation.7
5
Several conclusions can be drawn from this discussion of recent
school desegregation litigation. First, segregative intent will gen-
erally be the critical issue in any attempt to prove unconstitutional
racial segregation within a particular school district. This fact is
witnessed most dramatically in the Morgan case, where, as a pre-
requisite to the proof of de jure segregation, the district court spe-
cifically distinguished intent and motive.76 Both the district court
73. A school board which neglects to avoid racial segregation
in its school is itself causing or bringing about, as an agency
of the state, racial segregation. This is so because a school
board, like other legal entities, must be held accountable for
the natural, foreseeable, and avoidable consequences of its ac-
tivities and policies.
383 F. Supp. at 734. The district court inferred segregative intent
when neighborhoods which were used to determine school assignments
were racially identifiable. The court termed such policy "racial clas-
sification once-removed." Id. at 735.
74. 512 F.2d 37 (2d Cir. 1975).
75. [W]e believe that a finding of de jure segregation may be
based on actions taken, coupled with omissions made, by gov-
ernmental authorities which have the natural and foreseeable
consequence of causing educational segregation....
To say that foreseeable must be shown to have been ac-
tually foreseen would invite a standard almost impossible of
proof save by admissions. When we consider the motivation
of people constituting a school board, the task would be even
harder, for we are dealing with a collective will ....
The more orthodox test is the objective one .... The de-
sign or intent thought to be prerequisite to a de jure finding
may be evidenced by the performance of acts, the foreseeable
consequence of which is segregation.
Id. at 50-51.
76. See note 66 and accompanying text supra.
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and court of appeals in the Omaha case recognized the significance
of the proof of segregative intent, and both predicated their respec-
tive opinions upon this narrow issue. Second, the recent constitu-
tional trend has been to treat natural and foreseeable segregative
consequences as presumptive of segregative intent.77 School board
decisions necessarily involve group will, which can not be readily
ascertained by objective proof.78 However, the "natural and fore-
seeable test" mitigates the onerous evidentiary burden of proving
intent by providing an objective framework from which courts can
imply a rebuttable segregative presumption. This standard is re-
alistic in its approach since it requires the plaintiffs to prove some-
thing that is ascertainable from objective criteria. Once this proof
has been met, the burden shifts to the defendant-school board to
negate the inference of segregative intent which has been shown
to be objectively apparent from its policies and actions. Thus, the
"natural and foreseeable consequences test" reflects fairly and ac-
curately the relative positions of the respective parties in the litiga-
tion as far as their ability to ascertain and accumulate evidence.
As pointed out by the court of appeals in the Omaha case, the
district court's failure to recognize the presumption of segregative
intent inherent in natural and foreseeable segregative consequences
was its principal error.79 Even more significant, however, was the
district court's failure to promulgate an adequate legal standard for
determining segregative intent. The court merely stated that nat-
ural and foreseeable consequences constitute only "one additional
factor to be weighed in evaluating intent."8 0  What these "addi-
77. See notes 51-75 and accompanying text supra. One commentator has
stated that the Keyes doctrine could stand for the principle that intent
could now be inferred where school authorities undertake facially in-
nocent conduct, such as implementing a neighborhood school policy
over a large racially identifiable residential area, when the end result
is racial segregation. See Comment, supra note 22, at 150.
78. Since intent is a subjective concept and not readily observable, it can
be proved only by objective criteria such as statements or actions.
"[W] e can only emphasize that there are very few cases of school seg-
regation today in which the defendants admit that they had an im-
proper intent. Such intent may then be properly inferred from the
objective actions." United States v. Board of School Comm'rs of In-
dianapolis, 474 F.2d 81, 88 (7th Cir. 1973).
79. See notes 34-37 and accompanying text supra.
80. See note 33 and accompanying text supra. The need for adequate
legal guidelines for determining segregative intent was recognized by
the Supreme Court in Keyes. Although the requirements for the ini-
tial determination of intent were not specifically at issue, in dicta the
Court promulgated a standard based upon examples of specific hypo-
thetical acts by a school board which would provide the "predicate"
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tional factors" were was never specifically expressed. The result
was a factual analysis by the district court laced with rationaliza-
tion and question begging.8 1
The court of appeals, on the other hand, promulgated a legal
standard for determining intent which was based on recent federal
desegregation decisions. The court referred to both the Hart and
Oliver cases in concluding that acts or omissions having natural
and foreseeable segregative consequences imply a rebuttable pre-
sumption of segregative intent.8 2 Application of this constitu-
tional standard resulted in an objective analysis of the facts of the
particular case. The appellate court reversed the district court,
concluding that there was sufficient evidence to raise a presumption
of segregative intent within the Omaha School District. A desegre-
gation remedy was ordered accordingly.
V. CONCLUSION
The success or failure of modern desegregation litigation will
hinge on proof of segregative intent. Intent is a subjective concept
best ascertained through objective proof of what are the natural
,nd foreseeable consequences of school board acts or omissions.
In the Omaha case, the district court's failure to apply a presump-
tion of unconstitutional segregation to school board decisions, which
produced natural and foreseeable segregative consequences, re-
sulted in reversal by the court of appeals. By applying this segre-
gative presumption, the appellate court concluded that the Omaha
School District was in fact unconstitutionally segregated. This
necessitated a judicial remedy. In its historical perspective, the
legal standard promulgated by the court of appeals for determining
segregative intent and the conclusions derived therefrom are
neither unique nor unprecedented; they are correct. "Separate ed-
for the inference that a dual school system existed. See Keyes v.
School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 201-02 (1973).
81. At one point in its opinion, in discussing racial segregation allegedly
maintained by the use of portable classrooms at several overcrowded,
predominantly black elementary schools, the district court stated:
The Court agrees that some restructuring was possible
which would have increased a better racial balance at these
schools .... But it is also clear that at the time in question,
this restructuring of enrollments... simply was not a method
used by the School District to alleviate overcrowding.
389 F. Supp. at 299. Since the policies of the school board were being
examined for segregative intent, to justify the segregative impact of
a school board policy by reference to that policy was begging the
question.
82. See note 35 and accompanying text supra.
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ucational facilities are inherently unequal; '8 3 all vestiges of state-
imposed racial segregation are to be eliminated "root and branch."8 4
James R. Nearhood '76
83. 347 U.S. at 495.
84. Green v. School Bd. of New Kent County, 391 U.S. 430, 438 (1968).
